Previous techniques for information smuggling involved encryption, complex network tunneling, or (better define this term)special clients.  These do not work well in environments of despotic control.  They provide evidence of subverting authority, for which the (better define this term)user may be punished.  The availability of the clients are as restricted as the information to which they would provide access. The learning curve also limits which people can use the techniques. By utilizing a technique which is support by main stream web browsers, project FOIH will enable the masses access to information, without a prerequisite, non-mainstream client or advanced networking and encryption.

Censorship filters come in two forms: content vector filters and URL filters.  Content Vector Filters block access based on phrases using keyword lists.  URL filters deny access based on the host, path, or query of the request.  Thus, to allow information to be indiscriminately passed to the end users, FOIH must circumvent both censorship techniques.

Project FOIH's countermeasure for Content Vector Filters is to obfuscate the content, using encryption, so that it cannot be examined "in flight".  The obfuscation process is a simple substitution cipher.  Deniable cryptography is not part of the FOIH's objective, so encryption strength is not an issue.  However it would require an immense amount resources for a filter to decrypt every text appearing cryptic, and to pass traffic at network speeds.  Therefore, simple encryption is sufficient for our needs in obfuscation -- making it highly difficult for the filter to drop the packet based on key phrases alone.  The encrypted html is accompanied with a Javascript decryption function.  The function rewrites the document automatically, and without the (define this term)user's knowledge.

It is possible for the filter to detect encryption and drop the transfer by using character frequency analysis.  Character frequency analysis (find a better definition) examines the distribution of characters and compares them to the normal frequency of the selected language.  If a comparison fails to match, the transfer is perceived to be encrypted, and the transfer is stopped.  To circumvent this analysis, FOIH will insert "non-offensive" dictionary words until the file matches the correct distribution of characters.

To provide access for blocked sites, FOIH will act as a proxy.  Called with no arguments, FOIH will generate an obfuscated Common Gateway Interface (CGI) form.  The user will then enter the desired URL, and FOIH will react by transforming and return an obfuscated version of the requested URL.  However, filters can identify, and block, URLs specified in GET and POST queries.  In response to this technique, FOIH randomly chooses between GET and POST methods and the request will be sent as obfuscated data back to the FOIH CGI.

As FOIH's popularity increases, so shall filters' increase their resistance FOIH.  Not only must the data be obfuscated, but the method, and even the act of obfuscation must be obfuscated.  Although it would be impractical for a high-bandwidth filter to decrypt simple substitution on every website being received, it could be possible for a local filter, such as one "protecting" a library, to attempt to decrypt all html traffic in order to spot obfuscation hidden behind FOIH's "counter frequency analysis" method.  It is also likely that future filters will search for Javascript which rewrite the document.

This process of natural selection between text obfuscation and content filters will force FOIH to be an ever evolving force implementing new counter measures.  As filters improve in the performance of mass simple decryption, fake character frequencies will not suffice in obfuscating the presence of encryption.  FOIH will need to implement more processor and bandwidth intensive encryption systems.

Javascript was chosen to implement the decryption due to its simplicity and widespread support.  However, FOIH's dependence on this language will become an Achilles heal.  In order to prevent content filters from blocking a FOIH "signature".  FOIH must become more dynamic with more choices and thus use multiple languages such as Java, ActiveX, and VB script for the decryption method.